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The Talent Agencies Act:
Reconciling the Controversies
Surrounding Lawyers,
Managers, and Agents
Participating in California's
Entertainment Industry
Money it's a crime,
Share it fairly,
But don't take a slice of my pie.'
- Pink Floyd, "Money"
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost a hundred years, Southern California has been known as a basin
of artistic talent and as an avid protector of artists' rights.2 As a consequence,
California's entertainment industry has emerged as one of the state's greatest
sources of revenue.3 Despite California's reputation for earning and producing at
a phenomenal rate, greater than that of most countries, all is not well in the land
of fiction. As the pot of money at the end of the entertainment rainbow has
expanded, so too have the controversies and confusions regarding just how to slice
the industry's pecuniary pie. Remarkably, the Talent Agencies Act4 (hereinafter
"TAA" or "Act") has emerged as a principle battleground for this struggle.
This Comment explicates the fiscal war currently being waged among the
entertainment industry's lawyers, managers, and agents. In particular, this
Comment will focus on the interplay, roles, and prominent controversies that have
served as the backdrop between these powerful players as the fight for financial
and legal footing has intensified. Part II of this Comment defines the contempo-
rary roles of the lawyer, manager, and agent participating in California's
entertainment industry and introduces the dispute between managers and agents.5
I. PINK FLOYD, MONEY, THE DARK SIDE OF THE MOON (Capitol Records 1973).
2. See James M. O'Brien III, Regulations ofAttorneys Under California's Talent Agencies Act: A
Tautological Approach To Protecting Artists, 80 CAL. L. REv. 471,472 (1992).
3. See generally Jon Garon, Star Wars: Film Permitting, Prior Restraint & Government's Role in
the Entertainment Industry, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 5-11 (discussing significant economic impact
of the entertainment industry in California, and describing it as one of California's largest industries); see
also generally Abilio Tavares, Jr., The Entertainment Economy, 23 L.A. LAW 60 (2000) (describing
California's entertainment industry).
4. CAL. LAB. CODE §§1700-1700.47 (Deering 1991 & Supp. 2000).
5. See infra notes 10-51 and accompanying text.
Part III delineates the history of legislative efforts aimed at protecting artists'
rights in California that culminated in the TAA.6 Part IV explains in full the
disputes andcontentions between managers and agents.' Part V explores whether
lawyers should be exempt from the provisions of the TAA or any such regulatory
scheme.8 Finally, Part VI outlines foundational principles and rudimentary
considerations underlying a solution to the controversies and confusions presently
surrounding lawyers, managers, and agents in California's entertainment
industry.9
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Contemporary Roles of the Lawyer, Manager, and Agent
A full appreciation of the controversies and confusions involving the TAA
explored below cannot be attained without a clear understanding of the contempo-
rary roles of lawyers, managers, and agents in the entertainment industry.
1. Lawyers
Most agree that the lawyer's role is indispensable in the entertainment
industry.'° Attorneys known as "entertainment lawyers" are actually full service
lawyers with clients involved in the entertainment industry. " As such, entertain-
ment lawyers are often well versed in several substantive legal areas such as
corporate and business law, tax and general accounting, labor law, intellectual
property, criminal law, family law, immigration law, and litigation." Perhaps the
only qualities that distinguish entertainment lawyers from other lawyers are the
entertainment lawyer's two greatest selling points: (1) a thorough understanding
of the internal workings of the entertainment industry; and (2) a variety of contacts
in the vocation. 3 Many would also argue that the entertainment lawyer needs to
be able to possess the ability to understand and reason with the impassioned,
creative, and often unpredictable temperament associated with entertainment
clients. 4
6. See infra notes 52-116 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 117-232 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 233-246 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 247-303 and accompanying text.
10. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 472.
11. See WU.LIAM D. HENSLEE, ENTERTAINMENT LAW CAREERS 1-9 (2d ed. 1998); see also O'Brien,
supra note 2, at 484-87.
12. See HENSLEE, supra note 11, at 4-9; see also O'Brien, supra note 2, at 484-87.
13. O'Brien, supra note 2, at 484.
14. Id. at 486 (citing MICHAELI. RUDDEL, BEHIND THE SCENES: PRACTICAL ENTERTAINMENT LAW 171
(1984). See also generally Donna G. Cole-Wallen, Comment, Crossing the Line: Issues Facing
Entertainment Attorneys Engaged in Secondary Occupations, 8 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 522
(1986)).
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Many attorneys cross over into more untraditional and more lucrative roles
in the industry. 5 For example, many attorneys represent artists in their varied
personal and professional affairs, while others represent motion picture studios,
record companies, and distribution entities in a variety of corporate and commer-
cial ventures. 6 Such lawyers in the industry have been known to package deals,
shop talent and creative material, and advise on financial matters. 7 As a
consequence, while representing their artist clients in a legal capacity, many
lawyers cross over into the definitional realms of agent and manager. 8 Motiva-
tions to cross over into these more untraditional areas, in addition to the financial
windfall often associated with representing artists in non-legal affairs, include the
opportunity to be involved with fascinating subject matter and an unpredictable
working environment. '9
Notably, the Act does not expressly mention the applicability of the Act
toward lawyers. This omission has created a controversy of its own.2' It has
become increasingly difficult to ascertain which rules of conduct govern attorneys
in the entertainment industry; the crossover entertainment lawyer may encounter
regulation under the ABA model rules of ethics, the TAA, and/or entertainment
guild and union directives."'
2. Managers
The personal manager has evolved into a powerful force in the entertainment
industry. Managers can command up to twenty percent of an artist's gross
income 2 and can obtain production credit that result in fees from studiosY
15. O'Brien, supra note 2, at 472,485.
16. Id.
17. Kenneth J. Abdo, Agents, Managers, and Lawyers: A Roadmap For The EntertainmentAttorney,
14 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 3, 3 (1996).
18. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 485.
19. See id. at 486-87.
20. See infra Part V and accompanying text.
21. O'Brien, supra note 2, at 485-86.
22. Abdo, supra note 17, at 3. There is technically no limit as to the percentage amount a manager can
receive, but the industry norm is twenty percent. Id.
23. Emmanuel Nunez, Entertainment Law Class Lecture at Pepperdine University, School of Law (Feb.
1999). In the entertainment industry, production credits can be used as leverage when bargaining with other
industry entities and financial organizations regarding future projects, funding, and so forth. Id. Thus, these
credits can be used to generate opportunities for the manager separate and distinct from their representation
with the artist. Id. Many managers are able to use the clout of their clients to get this benefit from the
studios; many managers do nothing but bring in their client and still receive production credit. Id.
Depending upon the size of the fee and/or the magnitude of the credit from the studio, managers can attract
and retain clients by not charging their clients. Id. This is an emerging phenomenon with bigger name
talent. Amy Wallace, Agents Losing Star Power, Celebs Flocking to Managers, CHI. SuN TMES, Dec.
20, 1998, at NC22.
Generally, personal managers are the talent's principal career advisor, concerned
with how money is earned.24 The personal manager's primary duties include
advising, counseling, and directing the most lucrative and fulfilling career path for
the artist, 5 Additionally, the personal manager may handle mundane day-to-day
activities, arrange meetings with other personal representatives, or act as the
artist's confidant in all matters of the artist's personal and professional life.26
Accordingly, by organizing both the artist's personal and professional life, the
personal manager liberates the artist, allowing the artist to spend the bulk of his
or her time being creatively productive.27
There are few limitations to the duties by which the personal manager is
bound.2" Due to the Act, however, the personal manager cannot actually procure
employment for the artist without facing the risk of severe consequences, such as
forfeiture of past and future fees and/or the rescission of a lucrative representation
agreement.2 9 No statutory regulation exists for managers. In fact, aside perhaps
from common law fiduciary duties, which have unclear application in the specific
context of the entertainment industry, no regulation exists for managers
whatsoever.'
3. Agents
Agents principally attend to one glaring need that managers cannot fulfill due
to the provisions of the Act-procuring employment for artists.3' The provisions
of the Act closely regulate agents. 3 Notably, an agent cannot receive in excess of
ten percent of the artists' gross income, a regulation promulgated in conjunction
with the various entertainment guilds and unions.
3
An agent's work includes the solicitation of engagements, the solicitation and
licensing of rights to creative works, and otherwise exploiting opportunities for
talent.' Naturally, an agent may reject employment opportunities, influence the
24. See Abdo, supra note 17, at 3. Business managers, as opposed to personal managers described in
the main text, are concerned with managing business and personal finances. Id. They are usually
accountants. Id. This Comment focuses solely upon personal managers as recognized in the context of the
entertainment industry.
25. See Heath B.Zarin, Note, The California Controversy Over Procuring Employment: A Case For
The Personal Managers Act, 7 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 927, 937 (1997).
26. Id. at 938-40.
27. See id. at 940.
28. O'Brien, supra note 2, at 483.
29. Id. at 474, 491.
30. Id. at 483-84; 492-493.
31. See Abdo, supra note 17, at 3.
32. See infra Part 1IID.
33. See Abdo, supra note 17, at 3. This figure was established using a concerted combination of the
policies of the California Labor Commission and the various guilds and unions. See O'Brien, supra note
2, at 480; see also Wallace, supra note 23, at NC22.
34. Abdo, supra note 17, at 3.
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direction of an artist's career, and negotiate all-or-nothing "package deals"' 35 by
exploiting business and personal contacts.36 In sum, the agent can, in addition to
procurement functions, perform all the duties of a manager without any repercus-
sions, as long as the agent stays within the black letter regulation of the Act.
37
Yet, unlike a manager, an agent cannot receive production credit or the resulting
fees from studios.38 Agents' fees are strictly limited to the aforementioned ten
percent figure.39
B. Statement of the Dispute Between Managers and Agents
To fully appreciate the legislative history of the Act, a rudimentary under-
standing of the principal disputes that have emerged between managers and agents
is necessary.
Talent agents advocate a strict reading of the Act; agents believe that
managers should not be entitled to perform any procurement duties whatsoever
until they too become regulated by the same statutory regulations and are subject
to the same fees promulgated by the Labor Commissioner.' Talent agents'
principal complaint regarding managers lies in the assertion that managers are
continually engaging in illegal procurement functions, thus infringing upon talent
agents' slice of the market."
The argument from the side of the personal managers is more complex, but
compelling nonetheless. Primarily, managers contend that the nature and realities
of the entertainment industry require that, in the normal conduct of their
profession, managers simply must engage in limited or incidental activities which
may be construed as procurement.42 Additionally, many deals in the entertainment
industry are made casually, such as at social functions, where a manager cutting
off a conversation for fear of offending the Act would be both awkward and
unproductive for everyone involved, except a talent agent.43 Meanwhile, managers
contend that their business does not constitute the kind of endeavor that can
35. See Wallace, supra note 23, at NC22. A talent agency can reap a huge windfall by negotiating
with television networks and movie studios a fee for the delivery of a "package" of talent that includes the
actors, directors, and writers to work on a particular project. Id. The package may, but does not always,
contain talent that the network or studio may not have otherwise chosen. Id. An example of a package deal
occurred with the NBC sitcom "Friends," a package that produced a fee of fifty million dollars for the talent
agency. Id.
36. Abdo, supra note 17, at 3.
37. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 478-79.
38. See Nunez, supra note 23.
39. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
40. See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 443 (1995).
41. See id.
42. See id. at 444.
43. See Nunez, supra note 23.
feasibly be subject to licensure."
Managers maintain that the realities of the industry dictate that the manager
become more deeply involved in the artist's life than agents and that the Act's
premise that the agent is the more prominent figure is erroneous.45 The personal
manager is often the artist's first representative because agents typically will not
accommodate unknown talent or talent that is less in demand;' managers are the
only individuals in the business that are actually willing to procure employment
for such artists.47 Yet, because managers are unable to procure employment for
fear of violating the TAA, the artist is virtually left without access to the
industry.4" Moreover, even when an artist can obtain an agent, managers contend
that the operational nature of talent agencies'are such that the agency often weighs
one client's interests against another's, while the manager is singularly looking
after the individual artist's best interests.49
Given the reality that only managers tend to shoulder the financial and
emotional risk inherent with unknown talent,5 ° managers argue that they should
be able to engage in at least limited procurement activities in order to increase the
likelihood that they will realize their investment in the artist.5
III. HISTORY
A. Initial Legislation
California has long been concerned with drafting legislation aimed at
protecting artists' rights in the entertainment industry.52 The first such legislation
was drafted as a direct response to widespread artist abuses at the hands of
unscrupulous talent agents. Talent agents became notorious for abuses "such as
sending female artists to houses of prostitution, sending artists to dangerous
44. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
45. See Chip Robertson, Comment, Don't Bite the Hand That Feeds: A Call For A Return To An
Equitable Talent Agencies Act Standard, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 237, 238 (1997).
46. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 481. From the artists' perspective, filmmaker Edward Bums revealed
the artist's reality as such:
You should know that the really tough part about screenplay writing is not the writing but
finding anyone in the business who will read your script- unless it is submitted to them by an
agent.... Apparently, however, there is some legal reason why industry pros can't accept
unsolicited scripts. So the Catch-22 is you can't sell a script unless you have an agent, and you
can't get an agent unless you've sold a script. Welcome to Hollywood.
EDWARD BURNS, THREE SCREENPLAYS 4-5, (Hyperion 1997).
47. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 481.
48. See id. at 481,483-84.
49. See Wallace, supra note 23, at NC22.
50. See O'Brien, supra note 2 at 482. Managers often provide the struggling artist with financial
support such as costs of rent, tuition for lessons, and other living and professional costs until the artist's
career takes off, not to mention the free costs of the manager's counseling, expertise, and contacts. See
Zarin, supra note 25, at 928-31.
5 1. See Robertson, supra note 29, at 267.
52. See id. at 228.
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locations, arranging for minors to work in bars [and other unsuitable locales,] and
splitting fees with owners [and] managers of the venues that booked artists. 5 3 In
1913, California established licensing requirements for all types of employment
agencies when the Legislature passed the Private Employment Agencies Law.'
Similarly, in 1937 the Artist Manager Law ("AML") was adopted into the state's
labor code.5 The AML's creation highlighted the importance of protecting artists'
rights in the state's burgeoning entertainment industry. 6
Expanding on the principles first enunciated in the AML, California's
Legislature sought to create greater protections for the artist when it passed the
Artist Managers Act ("AMA") in 1943."7 The AMA created four regulatory
categories that, in the aggregate, recognized the varying needs of artists within
different niche areas of the entertainment industry." While the AMA did manage
to codify the duties now associated with contemporary managers and agents, the
AMA failed to recognize a then-emerging reality in the industry-that the duties
recognized within this single occupation were quickly becoming bifurcated into
two different, albeit overlapping, jobs.59 Not surprisingly, coupled with the rapid
growth of the industry, this overlap of employment relationships made implemen-
tation of the Legislature's regulatory categories impossible.'
In order to clarify the AMA and narrow its focus upon the procurement
functions of talent agents, the Legislature repealed certain regulatory categories
in 1967.6' This amendment, however, did little to address and rectify the growing
range of practical problems with the AMA that those in the industry already dealt
with on a daily basis.62 As talent agencies increased in size, focused more of their
attention toward the procurement of employment, and began to shy away from
more personalized artist services such as publicity and other day-to-day problems,
"personal managers" emerged with greater prominence, filling this emanating
void in assistance for artists and further confusing the hazy line between
themselves and agents. 63 Despite this trend, the Legislature neglected to
53. See Zarin, supra note 25, at 943-44.
54. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 228. A 1923 amendment to the PEAL empowered the Labor
Commission to preside over disputes. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 228-229.
59. See id. at 229-31.
60. See id. at 229; see also Raden v. Laurie, 262 P.2d 61 (Cal. App.2d 1953) (explicating the
confusion created by the AMA); see also Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (1967).
61. Robertson, supra note 45, at 230. "[The] Legislature repealed the classifications for motion picture
and theatrical employment agents." Id.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 231 (citing Neville L. Johnson & Daniel Webb Lang, The Personal Manager in the
California Entertainment Industry, 52 CAL. L. REV. 375,395 (1979)).
accurately measure prevailing quandaries experienced by those in the industry.'
As a result, those in the field could not determine the classes of individuals and
specific activities that were subject to regulation under the AMA.65 Notable cases
attributable to this controversy and triggered by the AMA, such as Raden v.
Laurie66 and Buchwald v. Superior Court,6 7 failed to clarify or settle these clouds
of confusion.6
B. Emergence of the Talent Agencies Act
In 1978, the Legislature attempted to iron out the problems associated with
the AMA. 69 The eventual product was actually an amended version of the Talent
Agencies Act of 1978.70 Significantly, at the time of this amendment, a proposal
for an "incidental exemption" for managers to the licensing requirement was
denied." The proposed incidental exemption would have shielded managers from
the harsh remedies associated with unlawful procurement of employment such as
the forfeiture of fees earned and the rescission of lucrative contracts.72 The
incidental exemption would only have applied to persons engaged with managing
artists whereby such representation only incidentally involved the seeking of
employment.73
As adopted by the Legislature, the expressed intent of the 1978 TAA was "to
regulate only those whose primary purpose and function is the securing of
employment for artists."'74 However, once again, the Legislature fostered confusion
by failing to stipulate precisely which individuals and specific activities fall
beneath the umbrella of the new licensing requirements.75 In the absence of a
clear test for the industry to follow, the previous problems continued to surface and
the need for clarity was sustained.76
Notwithstanding the ongoing controversy, the Labor Commission in Derek
v. Callan77 and Pryor v. Franklin" strictly applied the TAA of 1978.' 9 In both
64. Id. at 230.
65. See id.
66. See infra Part IV.A.I.
67. See infra Part IV.A.2. The Buchwald case "established the authority of the Labor Commissioner
to determine controversies and guaranteed the right of trial de novo." Robertson, supra note 45, at 232.
68. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 230-32.
69. See id. at 232.
70. Id. at 233 (stating that "[tihe legislature amended the 'Artists' Managers Act to the 'Talent
Agencies Act of 1978"'). Id.
71. See id. at 232-33.
72. See Zarin, supra note 25, at 953-53 (discussing remedies for TAA violations).
73. See id. at 932.
74. Neville L. Johnson& Daniel Webb Lang, The Personal Manager in the California Entertainment
Industry, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 375, 388 (1979).
75. Robertson, supra note 45, at 233.
76. See id.
77. Cal. Labor Comm'n No. TAC 18-80 (1982); see infra note 140.
78. Cal. Labor Comm'n No. TAC 17 MP 114 (1982); see infra note 140.
79. Robertson, supra note 45, at 235.
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disputes, personal managers were forced to forfeit their lucrative contractual
relationships with artists due to incidental procurement activities in violation of
the TAA.W Not surprisingly, industry professionals-particularly managers-were
unsatisfied with these decisions due, once again, to the absence of clear rules for
determining which activities trigger the Act."'
In 1982, the TAA endured additional experimental amendments.8 2 An
amendment was added to the TAA that allowed an unlicensed person to avoid
violation of the Act by working together with a licensed agent when negotiating
contracts.83 A recording exception was also added, which allowed an individual
to procure a recording contract without a license.' Furthermore, the Legislature
created the California Entertainment Commission for the purpose of reviewing
and recommending changes to the TAA in light of the technical concerns
repeatedly voiced by those operating in the industry.
C. The California Entertainment Commission85
The California Entertainment Commission ("CEC") was formed with an eye
toward putting to rest the controversies and uncertainties connected with the
TAA.86 The CEC was ordered to:
[s]tudy the laws and practices of this state, the State of New York, 7 and
other entertainment capitals of the United States relating to the licensing
of agents and representatives of artists in the entertainment industry in
general . . . so as to enable the commission to recommend to the
Legislature a model bill regarding this licensing. 8
80. See id. at 233-35.
81. Seeid. at235.
82. Id. at 235.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 235-36.
85. The CEC consisted often members. See Waisbren v Peppercorn Productions, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr.
2d 437,443 n.12 (1995). Three were appointed by the Governor, three by the Speaker of the Assembly,
and three by the Senate Rules Committee, in addition to the Labor Commissioner. Id. "Each appointing
power had to appoint a licensed talent agent, a personal manager, and an artist." Id. As such, the appointed
portion of the CEC consisted of three licensed talent agents, three personal managers, and three artists. Id.
The Labor Commissioner chaired the Commission. Id.
86. See id. at 442-43.
87. Significantly, the State of New York's version of the Act employs an incidental exemption. Zarin,
supra note 25, at 965-69.
88. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443 (quoting former Lab. Code § 1702, added by stats. 1982, ch.682
§6, p.2 8 1 6 and repealed by stats. 1984, ch.553 § 6, p.2187).
The CEC was asked to settle several specific issues.89 First, the CEC was
asked to determine, under certain circumstances, whether a manager should be
able to procure employment.' Second, the CEC was asked to explore whether
"the entire Act [should] be repealed and/or [if] there [should] be a separate
licensing law for personal managers."'" Third, the CEC was asked to suggest
what changes, if any, should be made to the TAA of 1978.92
The CEC met fifteen times over two years and delivered its report to the
Legislature and the Governor on December 2, 1985.9" The majority of the
members found that "the Talent Agencies Act of California is a sound and
workable statute and the recommendations contained in this report will, if enacted
by the California Legislature, make that Act a model statute of its kind in the
United States."' As such, the CEC recommended only minor statutory changes, 95
and that the Act remain the same with respect to requiring a license for procure-
ment activities of any kind, whether they be deemed incidental or otherwise.'
Also, the CEC recommended permanent adoption of the 1982 experimental
amendments.
Significantly, the CEC report stated that "[n]o person, including personal
managers, should be allowed to procure employment for an artist in any manner
or under any circumstances without being licensed by a talent agent."'97 The CEC
reasoned "[t]here can be no 'sometimes' talent agent, just as there can be no
'sometimes' professional in any other licensed field of endeavor. 9 8 Thus, at least
in regard to the Act's licensing requirement, the CEC opted for a strict applica-
tion, or black letter approach, toward administering this mandate of the TAA.9
The Legislature adopted all of the CEC's recommendations, and the Governor
signed them into law, thus creating the TAA of 1986. "° As such, the implementa-
tion of the CEC became significant because of the realization that the Legislature
and the Courts deferred to the CEC's findings as the default, or tie-breaking vote,
in the controversy over the issues surrounding the incidental exemption and other
89. Robertson, supra note 45, at 236. In addition to those issues stated above, the CEC was also asked
to determine if the recording exemption should be altered or repealed. Id. Also, the CEC was asked to
decide whether criminal sanctions should be reinstated. Id. Finally, the CEC was asked to make a decision
as to whether the added sunset provisions should be deleted. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
94. Id. (quoting the CEC's report at 4).
95. The CEC adopted provisions allowing the unlicensed individual to work in conjunction with a talent
agent. Robertson, supra note 45, at 237. The CEC also repealed criminal sanctions. Id. Further, the CEC
affirmed "the exemption for [the] unlicensed individual to [be able to] solicit, promise, or procure a
recording contract." Id.
96. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
97. Id. at 443 (quoting the CEC's report Executive Summary at 1).
98. Id. at 444 (quoting the CEC's report at 8-12).
99. See id.
100. See id. at443.
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manager/agent disputes.' No major changes have been made to the TAA since
1986.'0
D. Significant Provisions of the TAA 03
The Legislature sees the TAA as a device that both defines the role of the
talent agent and provides for the regulation of the talent agent in the entertainment
industry."° Notable provisions of the TAA of 1986 follow.
Article One delineates the scope and definitions of terms found in the TAA.
In this article, a talent agent is defined as a person engaged in the occupation of
procuring employment for artists."5
Article Two of the TAA describes the licensing procedures and makes explicit
the requirement that representatives who procure employment, of any kind, must
obtain a license."°  Article Two describes the application procedures and
technicalities, including costs and fees."° Furthermore, Article Two gives the
Labor Commissioner complete discretion to deny any application for licensure; a
denial generally occurs after an evaluation and hearing of the individual's
character and/or the nature of the talent agency."
Article Three regulates talent agents' business activities; this section of the
Act governs the day-to-day operational nature of talent agencies, prohibiting
certain forms of conduct and mandating that the Labor Commissioner pre-approve
any form agreements used to bind artists to the agency.1 09 Further, the TAA gives
the Labor Commissioner the authority and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
101. See id. at 442. In light of the CEC's slight changes to the existing TAA of 1978, it should also be
noted that the Court was already inclined toward accepting the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the
Act. See id. "If the administrative agency's construction is reasonable, a court should defer to it. Because
the Labor Commissioner's interpretation of the Act is reasonable, we agree with the analysis of the licensing
requirement." Id.
102. See Zarin, supra note 25, at 946-47 (discussing generally the CEC).
103. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700-1700.47 (West 1989).
104. Zarin, supra note 25, at 947; see also O'Brien, supra note 2, at 487-492 (thoroughly explicating
the provisions of the California Labor Code, otherwise known as the TAA of 1986).
105. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4(a) (West 1989).
106. Id. § 1700.5.
107. Id. §§ 1700.6-1700.22. See also Robertson, supra note45, at 237. The application fee is $25.00,
the license fee is $225.00, and the branch office fee is $50.00. Id. The talent agent must also post a
$10,000.00 surety bond, perhaps the most detested provision of the Act- especially for smaller agencies.
Id. (citing CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.4-1700.5, 1700.15).
108. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.8 (West 1989).
109. Id. §§ 1700.23-1700.47. In addition, talent agents must maintain a separate trust account for their
clients, retain records for their clients, refrain from making misleading statements, and avoid certain
payment practices. Id. Talent agents must also maintain records of the names of their clients, the amount
of fees received from their client, the engagements secured on behalf of each client, and the amount of
compensation received by each client. Id.
resolve disputes regarding potential violations of the TAA."' As such, managers
cannot escape the Labor Commissioner's authority when they procure employment
but fail to obtain a license."' Additionally, the Labor Commissioner has the
authority to fashion remedies for violations; these remedies can include the
disgorgement of past and future fees".2 and the rescission of lucrative representa-
tion contracts."
3
Although the Commissioner has the authority to award the manager or agent
some amount of compensation based on quantum meruit, most often the Labor
Commissioner exercises the power to divest unlicensed individuals of both past
and future compensation." 4 As such, most artists do not employ the TAA as a
shield to ensure the range of protections originally envisioned by the Legislature
when the various artist protection Acts were first drafted. "5 Rather, artists use the
TAA as a sword-to regain fees paid to their personal managers and/or to cancel
representation agreements." 6
IV. ISSUE ONE: MANAGER VS. AGENT CONTROVERSIES
The basic tenets of the conflict that has historically existed between managers
and agents were set forth in Part II.B. of this Comment."' In short, the tension
that exists most prominently between managers and agents centers around whether
the TAA should contain an "incidental booking exception" provision, a concept
that has been applied with apparent success in New York's analogous statutory
scheme. "'8
The incidental exception would shield many managers from the harsh
remedies associated with unlawful procurement of employment, such as the
forfeiture of past and future fees earned and the rescission of lucrative representa-
tion contracts." 9 The incidental exception would apply only toward those
individuals engaged in managing artists whose representation incidentally or
occasionally involved the seeking of employment. 20
110. Id. § 1700.44(a) ("In cases of controversy arising under this chapter, the parties involved shall refer
the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear and determine the same.")
111. See REO Broad. Consult. v. Martin, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 645-46 (Ct. App. 1999).
112. See infra Part IV.A.2. (referring to Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App.
1967)); infra note 140; see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 1986).
113. See infra note 140; CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 1986) (citing Humes v. Margil
Venture, Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Ct. App. 1985); Zarin, supra note 25, at 952-53.
114. Zarin, supra note 25, at 952-53.
115. See id. at 953; see also supra Part III.A-B.
116. Zarin, supra note 25, at 953.
117. See supra Part II.B.
118. See generally Zarin, supra note 25, at 965-70.
119. See Zarin, supra note 25, at 933.
120. See id.
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A. Case Law
Throughout the evolution of artist protection legislation, culminating in the
TAA of 1986, there have been several battles fought over the incidental exception
in the common law. Significantly, a common pretext exists throughout the
litigation-artists have been more concerned with the attempt at avoiding the
payment of fees and rescinding representation contracts than any other endeavor.
As such, the cases that follow present virtually identical fact patterns.
1. Raden v. Laurie'21
In a case arising under the AMA, Raden, a personal manager, sued his client,
Piper Laurie, for fees due under a written contract.'22 The contract espressly
stipulated that Raden could not procure employment for Laurie.'23 Laurie sought
to have the contract rescinded because Raden had agreed to seek employment for
Laurie as an unlicensed agent, a violation of the contract." The trial court found
for Laurie." Meanwhile, the Labor Commissioner determined that the contract
stipulation was a contrivance designed to cloak Raden's procurement activities.'26
Yet, the Appellate court rejected Laurie's argument that the act of seeking
employment, rather than the contract provision, triggered the licensing require-
ment of the AMA.'27 The court reasoned that an unlicensed individual's
procurement activities in seeking employment will trigger the licensing provisions
only if the contract is found to be a sham, designed to conceal the true nature of
the agreement between the parties and to "evade the law."'28 Thus, while the court
failed to affirmatively express whether a personal manager could procure
employment, the court implied that a manager could seek employment for an artist
so long "as the [procurement] did not result from contractual fraud or pretext."' 29
The Raden holding left those in the entertainment industry displeased because
the decision failed to clarify which specific activities and which individuals were
subject to the licensing provisions of the AMA.'30 Furthermore, Raden did little
121. 262 P.2d 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
122. Id. at 63. The AMA has been repealed. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
123. See Raden, 262 P.2d at 63-64.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 63, 65.
126. Id. Notably, an earlier contract between the two parties expressly stated that Raden "promised" to
secure employment for Laurie. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 229 (citing Raden, 262 P.2d at 63).
127. Robertson, supra note 45, at 230 (citing Raden, 262 P.2d at 65).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
to help tailor the AMA to the dynamics and realities of the industry. 3 '
2.Buchwald v. Superior Court'
3 2
The manager's position within the AMA's regulatory scheme climaxed in the
dispute involving the group Jefferson Airplane and their manager, Matthew
Katz.' 33 In Buchwald, Katz and each member of the band had a written agreement
in which a provision stated that Katz had not agreed to procure employment for
the band and that Katz was not authorized to procure employment." 4 The band
alleged that Katz had in fact obtained employment for the band and, as a result,
the band sought restitution for past fees paid to Katz.'35 Katz argued that the
contract provision established, as a matter of law, that Katz was not subject to the
AMA's licensing provisions.'36
The court rejected Katz's argument and found for the band, reasoning that the
Labor Commissioner and the court had the power to question the various
contracts' illegalities.' 37 Therefore, although the court did not explicitly answer
the direct question of whether a manager must obtain a license for incidental
procurement activities, the court recognized that procurement efforts generally
require a license and that the "substance of the parties' relationship, not its form,
is controlling."'38  The case firmly established the authority of the Labor
Commissioner to hear and determine controversies and guaranteed the right of
trial de novo upon appeal to the California Superior Court."'9
Unfortunately, the Buchwald and Raden cases collectively failed to delineate
just what kinds of activities triggered enforcement of the AMA, and many in the
entertainment industry anticipated further tinkering."
131. Seeid.at230-31.
132. 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1967).
133. Robertson, supra note 45, at 231.
134. See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prouductions, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 445 (1995) (citing
Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 364).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 232.
140. See id. In 1978, the AMA became the Talent Agencies Act of 1978. Id. As described in Part
III.C., supra, a proposal for a New York-style incidental exception was shot down and a strict application,
or black letter approach, toward dealing with procurement activities was adopted. Yet, as with the AMA,
the new TAA did not expressly delineate which individuals and which specific activities fell under the Act.
See id. Therefore, the controversy and confusion remained.
The first exercise in strict application came by way of a dispute between Bo Derek and her personal
manager, Karen Callan. Id. After an acquaintance informed Callan of a role for which Derek would be
suited, Callan casually mentioned Derek's name to the director as a possible candidate. Id. Later, after this
activity was deemed "procurement" and the court rejected Callan's defense of "incidental" procurement,
Derek was awarded rescission of a subsequent contract entered into between the parties whereby Callan was
to receive compensation for her negotiating services in regard to posters and t-shirts bearing Derek's
likeness. Id.
Likewise, the strict application approach was applied in a dispute involving Richard Pryor and his
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3.Wachs v. Curry141
In 1993, California's long-standing inclination in favor of strict application
of the TAA and its predecessors, and against the incidental exception, was
suddenly eliminated." In Wachs, a conflict arose between entertainer Arsenio
Hall and his managers Robert Wachs and Mark Lipsky.' The personal
management contract between the parties expressly stated that the managers had
not promised to obtain employment for Hall and that they were not authorized to
procure employment.'" However, Hall was able to prove that the managers had
promised the procurement of employment during contract negotiations.'45
Additionally, Hall was able to prove that the managers had indeed performed
procurement functions for Hall regarding Hall's successful talk show and on seven
other occasions.'" Hall sought to have the agreement rescinded when the
managers attempted to gain a share of the talk show's proceeds, an agreement to
which Hall contested. 4
7
The managers argued that the Act's licensing provisions were unconstitu-
tional on their face because no rational basis exists for providing an exemption for
the procurement of recording contracts but not for other kinds of contracts in the
industry.' The managers also alleged that the Act's provisions were unconstitu-
tionally vague. 49
Both of the managers' aforementioned arguments failed.so The court
reasoned that California benefits from a wide use of discretion in economic and
social legislation, and that a rational basis relationship attaches in cases of
occupational licensing.' Noting the enactment and findings of the CEC, 52 the
court ultimately determined that the reasoning provided by the Legislature's panel
manager David Franklin. Id. at 234. Pryor alleged that the personal management contract between himself
and Franklin was void because Franklin procured employment for Pryor. Id. Franklin asserted that he
merely responded to solicitations and that he was not "actively" seeking employment for Pryor. Id. The
Labor Commissioner rejected this defense, reasoning that the "furthering" of an offer constitutes
procurement because the intended purpose is to market the artist's talents. Id. Pryor was awarded past
commissions paid Franklin for a five-year period. Id. at 234-35.
141. 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496 (1993).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 498. The managers operated through their management company, X-Management.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 240.
147. See id.
148. See Wachs v. Curry, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496,498 (1993).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 504.
151. Seeid. at501.
152. See supra Part III.C.
of experts for the licensing exemption satisfied the rational basis test.'53 The court
also noted that there are numerous decisions that support the ideal that persons in
the same general type of business may be classified differently when their methods
of operations differ."4
The managers' second contention was that the language in the TAA was
unconstitutionally vague.'55 Specifically, the managers' contended that the terms
"procure" and "occupation" failed to delineate which individuals and activities
trigger enforcement of the Act.'56 However, the court rationalized that the
meaning of the terms were reasonably ascertained by reference to the common law
and the legislative history and purpose underlying the TAA.'57 In so doing, the
court found that "reasonable certainty" satisfied due process and constitutional
concerns.'58 The court stated: "[T]he statute has an objective content from which
ascertainable standards of conduct can be fashioned."' 59
Therefore, due to the managers' significant procurement activities, the court
ruled against the managers and awarded Hall the remedies of rescission and
damages in the sum of $ 2.1 million." ° However, without question, the most
significant development to come about as a result of the Wachs decision was the
allowance for the infamous incidental exception, repeatedly denied by previous
efforts in the Legislature.' 6' The court reasoned:
We conclude from the Act's obvious purpose to protect artists seeking
employment and from its legislative history, the "occupation" of
procuring employment was intended to be determined according to a
standard that measures the significance of the agent's employment
procurement function compared to the agent's counseling function taken
as a whole. If the agent's employment procurement function constitutes
a significant part of the agent's business as a whole then he or she is
subject to the licensing requirement of the Act even if, with respect to a
particular client, procurement of employment wag only an incidental part
of the agent's overall duties. On the other hand, if counseling and
directing the clients' careers constitutes the significant part of the agent's
business then he or she is not subject to the licensing requirement of the
Act, even if, with respect to a particular client, counseling and directing
153. See Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502.
154. See id. (citing Marsh & McLennan of Cal., Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1976)
(providing additional case support for proposition)).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. This is the test which satisfies due process as announced in Hall v. Bureau of Employment
Agencies, 138 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1992). A statute will not be held void for uncertainty so long as a reasonable
and practical construction can be given to the language. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502 (citing Hall).
159. See id.
160. Robertson, supra note 45, at 240.
161. See supra Part III.B and accompanying text.
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the client's career was only an incidental part of the agent's overall
duties. What constitutes a "significant part" of the agent's business is an
element of degree we need not decide in this case.'62
162. Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 503 (citing Hall v. Bureau of Employment Agencies, 138 Cal. Rptr. 725
(Ct. App. 1976)). Applying this rationale, three subsequent cases sought to implement the Wachs
"significance" test. In Church v. Brown, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 52-92 (1994), the Commissioner used
a balancing test to help define the fine line between what is, and what is not, an agreeable amount of
procurement in the manager's business. Robertson, supra note 45, at 243-46. The Labor Commissioner
declared that activities involving the representation of talent should be separated from activities that fall
outside of the artist-manager relationship. Id. at 244. Further, the Commissioner determined that a manager
cannot present a "second career as an affirmative defense to a violation of the Act." Id.
The Commissioner decided that procurement of employment constitutes a 'significant' portion
of activities of a [personal manager] if the procurement is not due to inadvertence or mistake
or is simply a de minimus aspect of the overall relationship between the parties when compared
with the [personal manager's] counseling functions on behalf of the artist.
Id. (quoting Church, No. TAC 52-92 at 12).
Thus, a two-prong test was developed for the Wachs significance test in Church. Id. To show a
violation of the Act, the artist must first show that the contractual relationship was breached by procurement
activities. id. at 244-45. Next, "the burden shifts to the personal manager [to show] that the procurement
activities did not constitute a significant part of [his] business as a whole." Id. at 245. The procurement
functions must have been a result of inadvertence or honest mistake. Id. If the testis fulfilled, the artist can
recover fees paid within the past year, which is the statute of limitations. Id.
A second application of the Wachs/Church standard involved a dispute between Pamela Anderson
and her manager Robert D'Avola. Anderson v. D'Avola, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 63-93 (1993). The
merits surrounding the dispute were virtually identical to those of the aforementioned cases. The factual
situation differed, however, in one respect-D'Avola attempted to get around the licensing requirements of
the Act by using a licensed agent as a "hip pocket agent." Robertson, supra note 45, at 246. Basically,
D'Avola was engaging in procurement functions while his hip pocket agent served as a front; the hip pocket
agent would initiate contacts with producers for parts discovered by D'Avola. See id. This practice was
not accepted by the Labor Commissioner. Id. at 247. In addition to stating that the use of a hip pocket
agent will not circumvent the licensing requirements of the Act, the Anderson case is also significant
because it represented a relaxing of the penalties awarded against a personal manager when "significant"
procurement is found. Id. at 248. Instead of awarding Anderson a disgorgement of all fees already paid
to D'Avola, "[tihe Commissioner bifurcated the business relationship into two distinct periods." Id. at 247.
Anderson was only awarded fees paid to D'Avola during the period in which D'Avola's procurement
activities exceeded a finding of"incidental." Id. at 248. Thus, D'Avola was able to retain fees earned while
he was not in violation of the Act, a seemingly more equitable standard in light of the factual nature of the
disputes previously filed under the TAA. Id. at 249.
Finally, in Ivy v. Howard, Cal. Lab. Comm. No. TAC 18-94 (1994), the Wachs significance test was
substantially narrowed to encompass "only those situations where the personal management contract is
silent regarding procurement activities." Robertson, supra note 45, at 249. Therefore, the incidental
exception was virtually eliminated, signaling that a return to the strict interpretation of the Act was
imminent. id. at 251. Indeed, in Ivy, the manager did not even procure employment for the artist; the
manager was stripped of his representation agreement merely because he had a provision in the management
contract stipulating that he would attempt to procure employment. Id. at 250.
4. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc. 163
Managers' hopes for a reliable and predictable interpretation and application
of an incidental exception came to a sudden and abrupt end in Waisbren.6' After
two and a half years worth of substantial tinkering with and modification of the
incidental exception inspired by Wachs in Division Seven,165 California's First
Division opted to return to strict application of the TAA.'6
Once again, the factual background underlying the dispute involved an artist's
attempt to avoid the payment of fees owed to their manager as agreed in the
parties' representation contract. 67  In Waisbren, Brad Waisbren promoted
Peppercorn under an oral agreement. 168 Part of Waisbren's activities included
incidental procurement.'69 After the agreement was terminated and Peppercorn
failed to pay fees owed under the agreement, Waisbren filed suit. 70 Peppercorn
defended his position, alleging that Waisbren procured employment without being
licensed.' 7' Waisbren admitted, and the court acknowledged, that Waisbren's
procurement was merely incidental.' The court held that Waisbren was required
to be licensed as a talent agent in order to perform even incidental procurement
functions and that the remedies of rescission and disgorgement of fees owed were
proper to ensure faithful adherence to the Act.'
The court reasoned that the provisions, or plain meaning, of the TAA
sufficiently enabled the court to ascertain legislative intent. 74 Notably, the court
rejected Waisbren's interpretation of "occupation" as "the principal business of
one's life."' 75 Citing directly to provisions of the Act, the Waisbren Court stated
that an individual could engage in an occupation even when most of his time is
spent on other pursuits.'76 Thus, a single person can function as both a manager
and a talent agent, subject to the licensing priovisions of the TAA.'77
Justifying a return to the strict approach and an abolishment of the incidental
exception, the court acknowledged the remedial purpose and nature of the Act.78
163. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d437 (Ct. App. 1996).
164. Robertson, supra note 45, at 25 1.
165. See discussion supra note 162.
166. See Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 437 (1995).
167. Id. at 439.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 439-40.
173. Id. at 447. The determination of the trial court, in which Peppercorn was granted summary
judgment, was affirmed. Id. Waisbren sought delinquent fees owed under the contract. Id. at 439. The
ruling of the court eliminated this claim. See id. at 447.
174. Id. at441.
175. Id.
176. ld.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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The court reasoned that the Act should be liberally administered to ensure that
artists are not abused, and that an incidental exception would cut against this
rudimentary purpose underlying the initial formation of the Act.179 The fact that
a manager's business is devoted only "incidentally" to procurement would be of
"little consolation" to the artist who falls prey to a violation of the Act. 8 °
Furthermore, the court expressed dissatisfaction with the fine line between what
constitutes "incidental" procurement and "principal" procurement activities of the
manager's business."' The court stated that "it would be virtually impossible to
determine accurately whether a personal manager had exceeded" the fine line.'82
The Waisbren Court also supported its decision by explicating the practices
of the Labor Commissioner, noting that the Commissioner, before Wachs, had
long accepted the position that a license is needed even for incidental procure-
ment. ' 3 Further, the court cited the findings of the CEC,' the history of the
Act, '8 and prior case law that ruled against the implementation of an incidental
exception"' to support the assertion that the Wachs ruling was wrongly decided. 87
It is important to note that Waisbren was not adjudicated in a court that has
the power to actually overturn Wachs.' Therefore, both decisions are technically
good law."'9 Since Waisbren, however, the Labor Commissioner, who possesses
exclusive jurisdiction over disputes before a case can reach the court via appeal,
has opted toerr on the side of historical precedent, embracing the Waisbren ruling,
dismissing the Wachs significance test, and strictly applying the TAA.'19
B. Recent Rumbling: The Michael Ovitz/CAA Controversy
1. The Story
Michael Ovitz was seen by many as the most dominant force in Hollywood
over the course of two decades while running Creative Artists Agency ("CAA"),
179. Id. at441-42.
180. See id. at 442.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 442 n.10.
183. Id. at442.
184. See supra notes 79-96 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 47-96 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 115-156 and accompanying text.
187. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442-45.
188. Robertson, supra note 45, at 254.
189. See id.
190. See id. Naturally, the cases that constituted the progeny of Wachs were similarly discarded. See
id.
a prominent talent agency.' 91 Indeed, Ovitz is largely credited with lavishing upon
the talent agency field its current structure, tactics, and lucrative status in the
industry. " Ovitz created the powerful Creative Artists Agency, helped train their
most prominent agents, and was paid tens of millions of dollars by the company
in severance when he left the company to become President at Walt Disney
Company. 193
However, after a short and unsuccessful tenure at Disney-ending when his
contract was bought out for over $100 million-and a couple of suspect invest-
ments, Ovitz decided to return to artist representation by starting Artists
Management Group ("AMG").194 Ovitz recognized that managers had increas-
ingly become dominant players in the entertainment industry and that the
possibility for huge dividends loomed large for that profession. 95
By partnering with hot young managers Rick Yorn and Julie Yorn, Ovitz was
able to get his business off the ground with immediacy."9 The Yorns represented
several young profitable stars such as Leonardo DiCaprio, Cameron Diaz, Claire
Danes, and Edward Burns. 97 Ovitz brought to the partnership his reputation as
a staunch protector of his clients and an unparalleled list of friends and contacts
in the industry.'98 Additionally, Ovitz brought to his new business a large list of
enemies, a reputation for demanding complete control, and an aura of paranoia
that Ovitz was once famous for creating and exploiting to his economic
advantage." Ovitz reportedly told friends in the industry that he planned to
reinvent the structure of the entertainment industry with his new venture."
News of Ovitz's new venture perturbed many agents throughout the
entertainment industry who assumed that Ovitz, although classified as a manager,
would procure employment in violation of the TAA and persuade artists to discard
their talent agents altogether.2°' In fact, this was precisely the position taken by
Ovitz's own former CAA, the talent agency from which Ovitz' initially began to
pull talent to institute his new business.2 ' 2 Within a matter of weeks, Ovitz was
able to lure directors Barry Levinson, Martin Scorsese, and Sydney Pollack, along
with actor Robin Williams, all of whom were CAA clients.2 3 Ovitz also
191. Corie Brown, Managing Hollywood: Michael Ovitz Eyes A Return To The Agency-Er,
Management-Business, NEWSWEEK, November 30, 1998, at 40, available at 1998 WL 17010856.
192. See Wallace, supra note 23, at NC22.
193. Bernard Weinraub, With Robin Williams, Ovitz Has A Very Big Bird In The Hand: First Marquee
Actor: Hollywood Mogul Isn't Afraid To Raid Agency He Founded, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999, at C 12.
194. Id.; see also Brown, supra note 191, at 40.
195. Brown, supra note 191, at 40-41.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. See Claudia Eller, Creative Artists Counterpunches in Ovitz Fight, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1999,
at CI.
202. See Weinraub, supra note 193, at C12.
203. Id.
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purportedly caused the defection of prominent CAA agents, who left CAA for
employment as managers at AMG.' 4 CAA contended that Ovitz's conversions
represented aggressive and hostile actions toward CAA and that Ovitz "raided"
CAA's clients and employees.2'
CAA attempted to slow the wave of clientele that suddenly began to choose
Ovitz's management company when they issued a risky ultimatum to their clients,
including stars such as Tom Cruise, Steven Speilberg, and Tom Hanks.2' The
ultimatum assured CAA clients that if they chose to retain Ovitz as their manager,
CAA would no longer represent them as their agent.' The ultimatum proved
risky on the part of CAA because CAA not only risked alienating their clients, but
CAA also started a heated controversy within the industry by boldly assuming that
Ovitz's new venture planned to violate the TAA.2 °8 Still, CAA felt the move was
necessary to protect the future of their livelihood.2° Said CAA president Richard
Lovett, "[Ovitz] is a competitor, not a collaborator."2 ' Shortly after the mandate,
Scorsese, actress Marisa Tomei, and actress Mimi Rogers, among others, left
CAA. 2
1 1
2. Preliminary Observations Under the TAA
Without question, the heat of the controversy and debate surrounding the
entire Ovitz/CAA controversy is rooted in the vast amount of money involved and
a track record of uncertainty as expressed by California's courts. Yet, from a
purely theoretical standpoint, as envisioned by the current rendition of the TAA
and the interpretation of the TAA by the Labor Commissioner, the fact that a
particular artist chooses a new manager should not have any adverse effect on said
artist's talent agency. This is*due to the fact that a manager risks losing
commissions and lucrative representation contracts for violating the TAA's
licensing provisions.2 Clearly, the manager vs. agent debate is approaching its
breaking point, and an Ovitz/CAA type controversy just may prove to be its
ultimate battleground.
The following observations operate under the premise that a venture, such as
204. See Lynn Elber, Hollywood Tussle Leaves Stars Stranded in Middle, STATE JOURNAL-REGSTER,
Jan. 27, 1999, at 15.
205. Eller, supra note 201, at CI.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Andrew Gumbel, The Dream Factory: The Return of the Talent Man, THE INDEPENDENT -
LONDON, Jan. 31, 1999, at 16.
211. Artists Take Sides in Agency Tiff, THE OTrAWA SUN, Jan. 31, 1999, at 6.
212. See supra text accompanying note 22-30.
that envisioned by Ovitz, will attempt to either ignore or circumvent the licensing
provisions of the TAA.
i. "You'll never work in this town again!"
In recognition of tie black letter of the TAA itself and the existing thread of
the common law on this issue,213 it becomes clear that the only way someone such
as Ovitz would face remedial sanctions under the Act is if an artist chooses to
sue.2"4 Indeed, the TAA is not a self-enforcing instrument."1 5 Generally, in order
for a case to reach the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Commissioner, the Act
must be activated by either an artist alleging unlicensed procurement or an agent
attempting to recover fees.216
Yet, if an artist chose to sue the powerful Michael Ovitz through AMG, he or
she would face the legitimate fear of being blacklisted throughout the industry.217
Given Ovitz's reputation for exercising and exploiting his clout and contacts, any
artist seeking to rescind a representation agreement or recover fees due to abuses
suffered at the hands of AMG would first be forced to balance the realization of
not being able to locate future employment with the gravity of the abuses they are
currently suffering.2"8 Thus, given Ovitz's weight in the industry, circumvention
of the existing version of the TAA is not only a reality, but a viable option.
ii. "Hey, the offers were incoming!"
In addition, Ovitz may attempt to hide behind the veil of his clientele's
success. Ovitz, in defending claims alleging illegal procurement activities, can
state that the offers were incoming, and therefore, not the result of procurement.
Of course, this argument falls prey to the reality that even the most established
artists such as Robin Williams typically want someone, typically an agent, to
search out the best material.2"9 Moreover, a defense asserting that all offers were
incoming contradicts, once again, the prevailing and well-documented observa-
tion-as espoused byentertainment industry managers-that incidental procurement
is an inherent reality connected with the job.22
213. See supra notes 115-182 and accompanying text.
214. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 1989). "In cases of controversy arising under this
chapter, the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear
and determine the same." Id.
215. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 492.
216. See id.
217. See Gumbel, supra note 210.
218. See id.
219. See Nunez, supra note 23.
220. See supra Part II.B.
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iii. "Is that an agent in your pocket?"
In the past, the Labor Commissioner has shut down calculated attempts aimed
at circumventing the TAA.21 For instance, one might envision Ovitz setting up
a token talent agency next door to the AMG building. This token agency would
place AMG's phone calls and, therefore, technically perform AMG' s procurement
activities while shielding AMG from allegations asserting illegal procurement
under the TAA. However, the Labor Commission has dismissed such practices in
the past, labeling them "hip pocket agent[ing]."222
In a 1991 dispute involving Pamela Anderson and her manager Robert
D'Avola, the Labor Commissioner found D' Avola guilty of attempting to use a hip
pocket agent in subterfuge of the Act.223 In the Anderson case, Anderson and
D'Avola entered into a personal management contract.2 4 Anderson was also
signed by a talent agency, a move designed to garner further employment
opportunities. 25  Meanwhile, D'Avola hired an additional agent to contact
potential employers on D'Avola's behalf; the agent played no significant role in
procuring employment other than placing the calls and acted strictly in accordance
with D'Avola's instructions.226 In 1992, Anderson stopped paying D'Avola,
alleging that D'Avola procured employment in violation of the Act.227
The Labor Commissioner ruled that D'Avola's use of the additional agent, the
"hip pocket agent," did not meet the exemption for personal managers working in
conjunction with licensed talent agents.228 Furthermore, the Labor Commissioner
held that D'Avola's use of the additional agent was an illegal attempt to use the
credentials of a licensed individual to procure employment for Anderson without
violating the Act.229 Thus, the court awarded Anderson fees paid and owed to
D'Avola during the period in which the hip pocket agent was employed and
during which D'Avola's procurement activities constituted a "significant" portion
of the relationship between Anderson and D'Avola.2 ° The reasoning by the Labor
Commissioner, arguing against the use of hip pocket agenting as a mere
contrivance to avoid the TAA, likely extends to similar,imaginative "fronts" that
221. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 246-49.
222. Id.
223. Robertson, supra note 45, at 247.
224. Robertson, supra note 45, at 246.
225. Id.
226. Id. at n. 243.
227. Id. at 246.
228. Id. at 247.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 248. Note that at the time this dispute was heard, California was operating under the Wachs
standard.
may be concocted by AMG in efforts to avoid the licensing provisions of the
TAA.23'
Overall, given the established parameters and benefits already attached to
being a manager, such as the ability to achieve production credit and fees from
studios, the receipt of fees from clients in excess of ten percent, and the absence
of a formal regulatory scheme, it is clearly against the financial interests of
someone such as Ovitz to attain a license under the TAA and operate a talent
agency. 2 As such, an Ovitz-type operation carries with it the potential of a direct
attack upon the TAA, the findings of the CEC, the recent Waisbren decision and,
ultimately, the profession of agenting as it is currently envisioned.
V. ISSUE Two: SHOULD LAWYERS BE EXEMPT FROM THE ACT?
Although the greatest amount of exposition in this Comment deals with the
controversies and confusions surrounding managers and agents, the TAA's lack
of attention and silence in reference to the potential applicability of the Act toward
lawyers fosters its own share of bewilderment. 233 This Comment takes the position
that lawyers, for the reasons propounded below, should be exempt from the TAA
and any version of any regulatory act that purports to govern the activity of
representatives of talent.2"
First, lawyers should be exempt from the provisions of the TAA because the
Legislature never intended for the Act to apply to the activities of lawyers. 5 The
Act, as historically explicated above, 6 was intended to protect artists seeking
employment or career advancement in the entertainment industry.237 Again, the
TAA fails to explicitly discuss attorney behavior.23
Second, much like the complaints issued by the entertainment industry's
managers, the Act is unjust because, due to the ambiguous word "procurement,"
the Act does not provide a discernable standard by which an individual can
determine if a violation of the Act has occurred.239 The TAA, the TAA's
predecessors and amendments, the CEC, California courts, and the Labor
Commissioner have each failed to define precisely which activities constitute
"procurement. '  Furthermore, much of the activity that has been labeled
231. See id. at 248-49.
232. See Wallace, supra note 20. Many managers are able to use the clout of their clients to ultimately
achieve production credit and fees from studios; many managers do nothing but bring in a client and receive
credit as a producer. Id. Depending upon the size of the fee and the magnitude of the credit from the studio,
managers can in turn attract and retain clients by not charging a fee. Id. This is an emerging phenomenon
with bigger name, highly sought talent. Id.
233. See generally O'Brien, supra note 2, at 492.
234. See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text.
235. See O'Brien, supra note 2, at 492.
236. See supra notes 52-116 and accompanying text.
237. O'Brien, supra note 2, at 493.
238. Id. at 496.
239. Id. at 492.
240. Id. at 497-99.
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"procurement" by the Labor Commissioner consists of ordinary attorney conduct
such as contract negotiations.24'
Third, attorneys should be exempt from the provisions of the TAA because
every conceivable activity undertaken by lawyers is already governed by the ethics-
based Professional Rules and the State Bar Act; even non-legal activities by the
lawyer are subject to discipline.242 These rules govern lawyer conduct to a degree
equal to, or far exceeding that, of the TAA. 243 Additionally, many of the TAA's
regulations conflict with many of these ethical rules.2' Therefore, artists are given
greater protection under the Professional Rules and the State Bar Act than under
the TAA, and licensure of lawyers under the Act would be duplicative, confusing,
and unjust. 45
Although there has not been a case directly on the issue of whether lawyers
are subject to the provisions of the TAA, explication of this issue remains
important because of uncertainty on the part of lawyers in the field and a level of
self-suppressing conduct that has unjustifiably attended such uncertainty.2"
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION: A COMPREHENSIVE ACT FEATURING
FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
A. Introduction
1. ASingle Act
The roles of the lawyer, manager, and agent in the entertainment industry are
continually changing. Indeed, the industry as a whole is constantly in a state of
transformation. Consequently, the TAA has become outdated and must be
replaced by a universal scheme that governs and makes sense of the realities faced
by all representatives of talent in the entertainment industry.
While this new scheme must reflect the ever-changing nature of the business
and roles of its players, this new standard must also remain flexible in the face
of future developments. Moreover, this new standard must tap into the spirit of
241. See id. at 492.
242. Id. at 492-93.
243. See id at 493.
244. Id. at 493; see also Part II.A.l (introducing conflicts between the TAA and ethically based rules
applicable to lawyers).
245. See id. at 493, 501; see generally Abdo, supra note 17, at 3-6 (discussing lawyer liability and
restrictions in the entertainment industry).
246. See O'Brien, supra note 2, 499 (noting certain interpretations of the TAA discouraging zealous
representation of clients).
early artist protection legislation in California, which was principally aimed
toward protecting artists against unconscionable abuses at the hands of their
representatives. 47 Indeed, today, while artists relinquish more of their earnings
than ever before to an assortment of people who perform many of the same tasks,
California's Legislature, Labor Commissioner, and Supreme Court have swayed
from this initial intent.
Overall, the driving forces underlying this new Act must include equity,
harmony, and predictability in order to facilitate smooth operation, despite the
overlap in activities of the various types of representatives. A carefully drafted all-
encompassing act, steeped in the principals of fiduciary law and composed in
consideration of the peculiarities of the entertainment industry, can achieve such
goals. The purpose of Part VI of this Comment is to present foundational
principles and rudimentary considerations underlying a solution to the controver-
sies and confusions presently surrounding lawyers, managers, and agents in
California's entertainment industry.
2. A Personal Managers' Act Is Not The Answer
In response to the dilemmas and uncertainty clouding the industry's lawyers,
managers, and agents, a commonly advocated solution calls for the establishment
of a Personal Managers' Act ("PMA").4 The most prevalent version of a PMA
would regulate managers, institute an incidental exception, and function alongside
the TAA that would continue to regulate agents.49 Advocates reason that the
implementation of a PMA would cure the ills currently felt by managers2' and
also provide an inexpensive forum for artists and managers to engage in
alternative dispute resolution.25 Even more importantly, a PMA could define
fiduciary duties that managers owe to their clients.5 2
While the PMA sounds attractive as a cure toward the ills felt by managers in
the entertainment industry, this solution fails to recognize several troubling issues
raised by agents and lawyers. Significantly, setting up separate standards for
managers and agents would foster additional conflict and tension between the two
entities. Inevitably, one entity will argue that the other entity's Act is more
favorable, and so forth.253
The ultimate shortcoming of the PMA suggestion is highlighted by the
247. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
248. Zarin, supra note 25, at 986..
249. See id. at 1003-04 (arguing for the implementation of a personal manager's act); see also Fred
Jelin, The Personal Manager Controversy: Carving The Turf, 359 PRACTISING LAW INST. 471 (1993)
(discussing the controversy and confusion surrounding personal managers in light of the Talent Act).
250. See supra notes 40-51 and accompanying text.
251. See Zarin, supra note 25, at 986.
252. See id. (discussing proposals in Gary A. Greenberg, The Plight of the Personal Manager in
California: A Legislative Solution, COUNSELING CLIENTS IN THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 514 (1993).
253. See, e.g., Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 501-03 (Ct. App. 1993); Waisbren v. Peppercorn
Productions, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Ct. App. 1995).
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realization that the TAA is simply outdated. The recording exception, for
example, represents a prominent, outdated component." Upon a review of the
rationale promulgated by the CEC and adopted in Wachs, 5 the rationale for the
recording exception can just as effectively be applied to other endeavors or realities
in the entertainment field.
As described in Wachs, the recording exception was instituted upon the
realization that the activities of procuring recording contracts were a unique
specialty in the entertainment field.5 6 Negotiations for a recording contract are
commonly conducted by personal managers or lawyers, not agents.257 Further,
personal managers for musicians often contribute financial support to the musician
until his or her career takes off. 5 ' The manager for the musician often acts as a
conduit between the musician and the recording company, and the manager also
acts as the musician's confidant in all matters-business, personal, and
otherwise.5 9 Finally, the activities of the individual who procures recording
contracts are ambiguous, intangible, and imprecise, making the conduct difficult
to license."
Extending the same rationale for the recording exception, described above and
in Wachs, to other specialties in the entertainment field, one could conclude that
the activities of procuring contracts for any genre in the entertainment field
constitute a unique specialty. 6' Negotiations for any genre or activity in the
entertainment field are likely to be conducted by a personal manager, not an agent;
the controversy over the incidental exception would not exist otherwise. 62
Further, personal managers for other artists in the entertainment industry often
contribute financial support to artists until their careers takes off.263 The managers
for other artists in the entertainment industry often act as a conduit between the
artist and employer, and the manager also acts as the artist's confidant in all
matters-business, personal, and otherwise." Likewise, the activities of the
individual who procures employment contracts for other artists in the entertain-
ment industry are ambiguous, intangible, and imprecise, making the conduct
254. See generally Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498. The Wachs managers argued that no rational basis
existed to justify the TAA's implementation of the recording exception, and therefore, that the Act was
unconstitutional, Id.
255. See id. at 501.
256. See id.
257. Id. (quoting Report of the California Entertainment Commission 13-14 (1985)).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at501-02.
261. See Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 501.
262. See id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
difficult to license.265 All told, the same rationale that established an exemption
relating to the procurement of recording contracts also exists for other genres in
the entertainment industry.2" Stated another way, the rationale underlying the
recording exemption engulfs the entirety of the TAA.
The illustration above is just one example of an outdated aspect propounded
by the TAA. Yet, what makes the TAA particularly outmoded is more a function
of what is not able to be confined within the black letter of the current version of
the Act. These deficiencies include, but are not limited to, the vague and
ambiguous language employed by the Act,267 the failure of the Act to reflect
realities in the business, the inability of the Act to remain flexible in light of an
ever-changing business climate,2" and the potential applicability of the Act toward
lawyers.269 Clearly, adding a PMA to the mix, in place of standardizing the
minimum legal obligations of representatives of talent, is not the answer or cure
that will address the ills felt by the entertainment industry as a whole.
B. A Fiduciary Influenced Model
1. Foundation
Fiduciaries can be found in many forms and substantive legal areas in the
common law.270 The forms in which fiduciaries appear include agents, partners,
directors and officers, trustees, and executors.27" ' The substantive areas of law
include contracts, labor, criminal, estate planning, and securities.272 Throughout
the past century, the United States experienced a considerable degree of expansion
and development in the area of fiduciary law.273
Simply put, "under fiduciary law, a business relationship is viewed in terms
of a dominant and a vulnerable party."274 In conformance with this Comment's
terminology, the representative is the dominant party, and the artist is the
vulnerable party.275 Thus, the dominant party or representative, by virtue of his
265. Id. at 502.
266. This Comment does not advocate that licensure attach upon managers who procure employment
for recording contracts. Rather, like those who procure recording contracts, others in the entertainment
industry should be exempt from licensure as well, contingent upon the idea that everyone involved in a
representative capacity is legally bound to a fiduciary standard.
267. See, e.g., Wachs, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 502. In Wachs, the defendant managers contended that the
terms "procurement" and "occupation" failed to delineate which individuals and activities triggered
enforcement of the Act. See id.
268. See, e.g., supranotes 121-190andaccompanyingtext(explicatingRadenBuchwald, Wachs, and
Waisbren).
269. See generally O'Brien, supra note 2.
270. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 796.
274. Robertson, supra note 45, at 265.
275. Id.
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expertise and the contractual nature of the parties' relationship, "owes a high level
of [care] towards the vulnerable party, the artist." '276 Significantly, in the context
of the entertainment industry, this high level of care is evidenced by the fact that
the representative often has 'a monopoly over -the artist's needs for a particular
aspect of the artist's affairs.277 In light of the high percentage of the artists' gross
income that managers and agents currently receive in exchange for their services,
even successful artists cannot afford to hire more than one talent agent (or talent
agency) and one manager.
Potentially, the representative is entrusted with the obligation to perform
several tasks.27 Naturally, the core feature of any representative's existence is that
the representative acts on behalf of, or as a substitute for, the artist in a variety of
matters including, possibly, procurement of employment or negotiation of
contracts.279 This feature allows the artist to delegate responsibility to the expert
representative and allows the artist more time to be productive in a creative
sense.n°  Once again, in promulgation of this new Act, California's
Legislature must take into account the characteristics and the scope of each
particular type of representative currently operating in the entertainment industry
so that a new Act encompasses all such distinctions. Prominently, the Legislature
must ensure that representatives avoid over-reaching in dealings with the artist.28 '
For instance, the representative must fully disclose all relevant information and
attendant consequences regarding the artist's welfare; the representative cannot
induce the artist to sign unconscionable contracts, and the representative must
inform the artist whenever the representative has a certain conflict of interest that
may affect his or her dealings with the artist.282 Moreover, the representative must
present conflicts of interest to the artist in writing, in easily understandable terms,
delineating the nature of the conflict.28 3
276. Id.; see Frankel, supra note 270, at 800.
277. See Frankel, supra note 270, at 801.
278. Robertson, supra note 45, at 265.
279. Frankel, supra note 270, at 808-09.
280. See id. By contrast, while in the absence of codification of fiduciary principles for the context of
the entertainment industry, a manager wields a potentially unconscionable degree of power over an artist
who is not business savvy. Presently, the artists' best chance at controlling their fiduciaries is by way of
threat of termination or carefully drafted contractual provisions. See id.
281. See Hall. Gilenson, Note, Badlands: Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts OfInterest in the Music
Industry, 9 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 501,543 (1991).
282. See, e.g., id. at 526-28 (explicating the conflict in Laurel Canyon, Ltd. v. Springsteen, N.Y.L.J.
Aug 25, 1976, at 6 col. I (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 19, 1976), aff'd 55 A.D.2d 822 (1st Dept. 1977), in which
a managerial contract between Bruce Springsteen and his manager-who owned an interest in the Laurel
Canyon publishing company-created a situation in which over a four year period Laurel Canyon made two
million dollars to Springsteen's $100,000).
283. Id. at 543. The representative should suggest that the artist have an independent lawyer check any
agreement between the parties for unconscionability. If the artist refuses, the representative should have this
fact reduced to writing. See id. at 544.
Simply put, under fiduciary law and codification of a new Act as suggested
by this Comment, the representative is barred from engaging in double-dealing,
exploitation of the artist, or other acts constituting bad faith.2" If the representa-
tive fails to meet these obligations, the artist may invoke protection pursuant to the
new Act and seek termination of the representation contract or restitution of fees
paid during the period of such wanton conduct."
2. Notable Inclusions/Exclusions
As a matter of construction, this new fiduciary-based Act should avoid
functional conflict with New York's allowance for the incidental exception.2"
Further, for reasons earlier explained,287 this new Act should expressly exclude
lawyers because they are already governed by ABA Professional Rules and the
State Bar Act.2' Lawyers should be held to the same standard as that applied to
non-entertainment related clients while not being afforded an unfair advantage or
disadvantage over non-lawyers operating in a representative capacity in the
industry. In addition, the new Act should heed the following considerations.
i. Non-Exhaustive List of Abuses
As a supplement to this new Act's codified fiduciary principles, presented in
the context of the unique climate of the entertainment industry, this new Act
should delineate a non-exhaustive list of traditional abuses that artists endure.
This list should include provisions that address a representative's potential
mismanagement of income, excessive fees, conflicts of interest, disruption of
existing contractual relationships, and misappropriation of funds, among others.289
Although such abuses would already be accounted for by the new Act through
application of its fiduciary principles, 29° a non-exhaustive list would put
representatives on notice and promote clarity in a number of instances. Such a list
would alert representatives to the fact that certain named activities have been
attempted in the past and will not be tolerated under the new Act. Notably, this
section will provide the Legislature with the opportunity to explicitly respond to
a plethora of controversies and confusions that have been troubling industry
managers, agents, and lawyers for decades.29" '
284. See Gilenson, supra note 281, at 526-34 (discussing fiduciary law), 543-44 (discussing proposed
legislation).
285. See infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdiction under the Act as proposed
herein).
286. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 258-62 (discussing New York's incidental exception).
287. See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 233-46 and accompanying text. See generally O'Brien, supra note 2 (discussing
regulation and enforcement of California's Talent Agencies Act).
289. See generally Frankel, supra note 270 (discussing problems which arise in fiduciary relationships).
290. See generally id.
291. See generally infra notes 40-246 and accompanying text.
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ii. Jurisdiction
292
This new Act should continue to allow the Labor Commissioner to review
disputes on an individual basis, applying the above-described principles and
weighing remedies for violations under an equitable guise.29 3 However, in direct
contrast to the TAA and its predecessors, which required that cases first be heard
before the Labor Commissioner before appeal was allowed to the California
Superior Court, the Labor Commissioner must not possess exclusive jurisdiction
to hear cases that arise under this new Act.2'
There are several conspicuous reasons for this fundamental change in
jurisdiction. First, because artists or representatives invoking protection under this
new Act shall invariably seek to supplement their complaint with common law
causes of action such as breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, misrepresen-
tation, misappropriation, and others, petitioners should be afforded the opportunity
to present their case for the first time in front of a jury.295 Second, claimants
should not be forced to incur the additional cost and expenditure of time associated
with an administrative remedy. Clearly, the Act as proposed herein constitutes a
radical change in substance and form as opposed to any of the outdated forms of
artist protection legislation-the TAA, AMA, AML, and the early Private
Employment Agencies Law, The ritualistic adoption of administrative remedies
that occurred upon the enactment of each of these pieces of legislation often
amounted to red tape that no claimant should be forced to endure in order to attain
relief. All told, claimants must possess the option of first presenting their cases
before either the Labor Commissioner or the Superior Court.
292. The TAA's administrative prerequisite, mandating that the Labor Commissioner first hear disputes
arising under the TAA before the case can reach the superior court, was inherited by the TAA from the
earlier forms of artist protection legislation, the AMA and the Private Employment Agencies Law (PEAL).
Buchwald v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. Rptr. 364,365,371 (Ct. App. 1967). The PEAL was the earliest form
of artist protection legislation in California, passed in 1913. Id.
293. But see id. at 372 (affirming the principle that the Labor Commissioner must first hear disputes
arising under the TAA before the dispute can reach the Superior Court because prior legislation also
included such mandate).
294. See id.
295. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 265.
iii. No Supervision Over Daily Affairs, No Pre-Approval of Forms, No
Licenses, Reduced Fees
Due to the fact that managers have never truly been regulated, many artists
are already accustomed to choosing their representatives wisely.2' Furthermore,
some artists are adept at negotiating for favorable terms in their representation
agreements. 97 These recognitions, coupled with the enactment of this new Act's
clear minimum legal standard for all representatives of talent, obviates the need
for many burdensome administrative and regulatory procedures. Specifically,
direct and pervasive interference with the daily operations and documentation
employed by representatives, as currently mandated by the TAA,2 9' will be
eradicated. Moreover, because the duties of all representatives are comprehensible
and standardized, the new Act shall not require such representatives to obtain a
license.2" Therefore, a broader range of capable fiduciaries can become
empowered with the responsibility of procuring employment without suffering the
attendant plethora of administrative obstacles currently required of talent agents.'
Even more, the new Act's clarity and elimination of the debate surrounding
the incidental exception will reduce litigation. Joined with the increased economic
efficiency connected with administering this proposed model, many of the fees
currently required by the TAA could be eliminated or reduced. Notably, the
$10,000 surety bond, required by the TAA by any new talent agency,3"' would be
eviscerated in light of the fact that, as applied to small start-up agencies, the bond
is overly burdensome and works a discriminatory effect in favor of larger more
established firms.'e
3. Random Effects
The uncompromising distinction between managers and agents will be
abolished with the enactment of the new comprehensive Act. Thus, the 50-year
debate over the incidental exception will be history. Agents will be able to become
producers if studios are apt to allow such a negotiation, and managers will be able
to procure employment without the fear of disgorgement and rescission. Current
talent agencies will be forced to become more creative and full-service oriented in
296. See Nunez, supra note 23. Many artists use their clout in the industry to eliminate their manager's
fee altogether. Id. This occurs when managers want to obtain production credit and studio fees pursuant
thereto. id. A manager can accomplish this by simply bringing their client's name and talent to a project.
Id. In so doing, a manager can receive his or her compensation from the studio, not the artist. Id; see also
Wallace supra note 23, at NC22.
297. See Wallace, supra note 23, at NC22.
298. See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1700.6-1700.22 (West 1986).
299. Butseeid. § 1700.5.
300. See generally id. §§ 1700.5-1700.22.
301. See id. § 1700.15.
302. See Robertson, supra note 45, at 237 (noting that the Act's requirement mandating the posting of
a $10,000 surety bond is perhaps the most detested provision of the TAA).
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the effort of retaining business. This effect is necessary and desirable for the
standardization of protection for artists. Moreover, equity between big representa-
tive agencies and the small start-up representative with only a few clients will be
fostered because there will no longer be excessive fees and administrative hurdles
tied to the privilege of procuring employment.
Materially, this new Act will allow prospective representatives of talent to
delineate a more personalized range of services they want to offer-all with the
foresight that they will be held legally accountable to a fiduciary standard. Thus,
each business will tailor its "representation contracts" accordingly; as long as each
contract is in compliance with the aforementioned standards, implicated by the all-
encompassing legislation, the parties' agreements can be as creative as the parties
desire.
Further, each individual representative, based on the full range of services the
representative opts to deliver, must negotiate with the artist for a percentage of the
artist's gross income. Given the fact that most talent, especially established talent,
already pay up to ten percent for an agent and an additional twenty percent for
their managers, it is likely that this fee will remain lower than the aggregate of the
fees artists are currently paying toward entities who are doing much of the same
work. Increased competition between representatives will also help keep
percentages down. Plus, under the new Act, the artist can hire a single entity to
achieve the full range of their desired services, or a number of specialized
representatives, as is the norm in the industry today. The bottom line is that the
artist will have a choice.
Furthermore, while this proposed legislation protects artists from all types of
representative entities-whether managerial or procurement based and irrespective
of operational size-the new model also protects representatives. 3 In addition to
providing a legal standard that is clear and functionally predictable, the new
model effectively extinguishes the inequitable practice long employed by artists
who have used the TAA as a vehicle to avoid paying managers because of
incidental procurement activities.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers, managers, and agents, as representatives of artists, all owe a duty to
their clients. Given the entities' common goal aimed toward helping artists
become productive and profitable, coupled with the vast and undeniable overlap
in the representatives' job descriptions, a single act must govern representatives'
activities. A fiduciary-based act, adjoined with the distinctions presented herein,
303. See generally Frankel, supra note 270.
constitutes the most reasonable path toward getting back to the original goal of
protecting artists, fosters consistency, and dissolves the controversies and
confusions now plaguing California's entertainment industry.
The state of the present conflicts demand that the California Legislature take
action. At stake is one of the most prominent sources of California's revenue and
the financial futures of a legion of artists, lawyers, managers, and agents.
GARY E. DEVLING
304. J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law, 2000.
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